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Introduction
1. This is the first paper issued under the auspices of ALPAN - The African
Livestock Policy Analysis Network. The first part of the paper sets a
framework in which policy, policy making and policy analysis can be defined
and the principal actors in the process of policy formulation identified.
It seeks to establish, therefore, an initial set of common terms and concepts
which will enable us to understand each other at the outset. We can amend
the terms and concepts later as we gain experience and find that
modifications are needed in our initial set to make them correspond better
to reality. The second part of the paper discusses how livestock policy
in Africa might be improved.
Livestock policy and performance
2. The performance of the livestock sector in sub-Saharan Africa over the
last two decades has been disappointing. During the 1960s African meat
production from ruminant livestock grew slightly faster than the human
population but milk output grew slower. In the 1970s the performance
worsened and both meat and milk output grew at only half the rate that
the human population did, and the growth in output that did occur was
almost entirely the result of increases in livestock numbers rather than
in yields per head (Anteneh, 1984). This poor performance by the livestock
sector was fairly uniformly spread across the different regions of sub-
Saharan Africa with only meat production in central Africa (which is small
in absolute terms) showing much favourable divergence from the general
pattern. However, the performance in some individual countries was
considerably better than average.
3. What were the causes of this poor performance? Not very much of it
can be attributed simply to poor rainfall since the Sahelian drought occurred
towards the beginning of the 1970s and the process of recovery from it
should have enhanced rather than depressed rates of growth in output.
Thi s One
  
RHB5-6F6-AJ35
4. The inadequate development, through research, of technology to improve
livestock production undoubtedly had something to do with the poor
performance. So, probably, did inadequate levels of investment in the
livestock sector, although we should bear in mind that much of the
investment in livestock projects which did take place was extremely
unsuccessful, yielding low or even negative rates of return. A higher
rate of investment by itself might not have boosted output very much.
5. There is a growing consensus that a major factor in the poor performance
has been the prevalence of inappropriate government policies which either
positively hindered or, at least, failed adequately to assist livestock
development. This growing consensus derives partly from a wider consensus
that Africa's agriculture sector as a whole has suffered from inappropriate
policies, and partly from the amassed experience of a large number of
individuals with detailed knowledge of livestock development efforts in
particular countries who believe that these efforts were frustrated because
they were carried out against a policy background which made their failure
almost inevitable. In illustration of this one can refer to a review of more
than 30 livestock projects in Africa financed by one major donor. In
the case of more than 75% of these projects inappropriate government
policies were judged to be major constraints on the projects' success.
6. Neither a general consensus nor the beliefs of sundry individuals of
themselves prove that it was policies rather than other factors which
were at fault; and a number of those who make policies in the livestock
subsectors of African countries strongly believe that often it is not the
policies themselves but their inadequate or inefficient implementation
that lies at the heart of the problem. Insufficient support from donor
agencies is also often blamed. However, when the policy is from the start
/ administratively and politically unfeasible it is clearly the fault of its
makers not of its executors and financiers. Some of the policies that
have been officially adopted required for their success a level of domestic
and external financing that was disproportionate to the countries' resources
and foreign support, as well as a willingness to offend powerful interest
groups which was politically unrealistic to expect. In other cases policies
may have been realistic at the time of their formulation but were rendered
obsolete by unpredictable changes in political or economic conditions.
7. In the past there has been a lack of firm evidence, based on research,
either that government policy can be effective, (for good or evil), in
influencing events in the livestock field or that the results of alternative
policies are sufficiently clear and predictable to enable sensible choices
between alternatives to be made. Some such evidence is now being
accumulated through work being done at ILCA's Policy Unit. For examples
von Massow (1984) found that in the case of the majority of countries
of sub-Saharan Africa for which the relevant data are available, less than
two thirds of the changes in commercial dairy imports could be explained
in terms of the factors which are normally cited as the main determinants,
i.e. human population growth or changes in per caput income or domestic
dairy production. The remaining changes have to be explained by other
factors amongst which government policies are probably the most important.
Anteneh (1985) has identified the decline in the quality of veterinary
services that arises from a policy which permits the staff costs of such
services to rise above the level of 50% of total operating costs.
8. In brief, the performance of sub-Saharan Africa's livestock sector has
been poor, and a major, but not the only, contributory factor seems to
have been inappropriate government policies. A revision of policies is
in the case of many countries an indispensable condition for improved
performance of their livestock sectors, although a revision of policies
by itself is not the only thing required.
Definition of policy
9. Obviously we must not get bogged down in mere semantics; on the other
hand the word "policy", which appears in the title of this paper and of
the ALPAN network, is a very elastic term and we need some working
definition of it from which we can all start together even if we choose
to amend it thereafter. In the following paragraphs I explore slightly
our concept of "policy" as demonstrated by our use of the word in the
English language. I appreciate that the French equivalent of the term
may have slightly different connotations.
10. A "policy" is very much like a decision or a set of decisions, and we "make",
"implement" or "carry out" a policy just as we do with decisions. Like
a decision a policy is not itself a statement, nor is it only a set of actions,
although, as with decisions, we can infer what a person's or organisation's
policy is either from the statement he makes about it, or, if he makes
no statement or we don't believe his statement, from the way he acts.
But, equally, we can claim that a statement or set of actions is misleading
and does not faithfully reflect the "true" policy.
11. In some other ways a policy is not like a decision. The term policy usually
implies some long-term purpose in a broad subject field (e.g. land tenure),
not a series of ad-hoc judgements in unrelated fields. Sometimes, however,
we conceive of policy not so much as actively purpose oriented but rather
as a fairly cohesive set of responses to a problem that has arisen. In
the sphere of government development activities, governments have
policies, plans, programmes and projects, each of these in succession
being a little more short-term, more specific in place and timing than
the previous and each successively more executive rather than legislative.
12. In the light of these considerations we can provisionally define a policy
as a set of decisions which are oriented towards a long-term purpose
or to a particular problem. Such decisions by governments are often
embodied in legislation and usually apply to a country as a whole rather
than to one part of it.
Functions, objectives and instruments of policy
13. It is useful to distinguish three rather different functions in relation
to policies. Firstly there is policy making, the act of making the decisions
concerned, and policy-making is naturally the prerogative of senior people,
just how senior depending on the importance of the policy concerned.
Secondly there is policy implementation - the executive activity of
carrying out the decisions made. Thirdly there is policy analysis, the
activity of identifying different policy choices and of examining the
actual or possible impact of these alternative policies to see how
successfully they comply with the policies' objectives. Policy-making,
policy implementation and policy analysis may all be carried out by the
same people, but in countries wealthy enough to afford the trained
manpower policy implementation and analysis are often carried out by
specialist groups of middle-level officials who advise and receive
instructions from the top-level policy makers. This paper is not
substantially concerned with policy implementation.
14. Implicit in the concept of having or making a policy is that one has a
choice or option to have this policy or some other one. If, in practice,
there is no choice then there can be no policy either. But in considering
options it is again useful to distinguish choices between the objectives
of policy — including the objective of overcoming particular problems
that have arisen — and choices between the different instruments, i.e.
methods, by which these objectives are to be achieved. Objectives and
instruments are conceptually distinct and both ,are integral to having
a policy although some writers (e.g. Thomson and Rayner, 1984) restrict
the scope of the term to policy instruments. Objectives and instruments
are best explained by way of examples.
15. Let us take the example of policies with respect to dairy marketing
systems, i.e. options between different ways of organising dairy marketing.
In considering these options a government may be motivated by one or
more of the following objectives:-
a) To improve the incomes of dairy producers by paying them higher
or more stable prices;
b) To secure plentiful and reliable milk supplies to urban consumers;
c) To provide milk supplies to urban consumers generally at prices
they can afford;
d) To improve the hygiene and quality of dairy products.
These are not the only possible objectives of policy in respect to dairy
marketing but they are among the most common.
16. In pursuit of these objectives a government has a wide variety of
instruments that it can use. Some instruments can serve several objectives
while others serve only one objective and may hinder others.
a) It can set up monopolistic dairy marketing organisations - private,
cooperative, or parastatal ones - in order to:
i. Secure economies of scale in collection, processing and
distribution,
ii. Operate monopolistic or monopsonistic trading practices which
enable the trading organisation to discriminate in prices and
quantities for or against particular groups of consumers, producers
or products, and
iii. Achieve improvements in quality and hygiene through direct
managerial control of processing, transport and storage.
b) It can license, inspect and regulate non-government and competitive
trading organisations so as to ensure compliance with minimum standards
as to price, hygiene and quality.
c) It can provide subsidies to producers or consumers or to particular
groups thereof.
Again, this list of instruments is illustrative rather than all-inclusive.
Objectives and instruments in dairy marketing are discussed in detail by
Mbogoh (1984).
17. Policy makers can make choices with respect to both objectives and
instruments. Such choices do not have to be totally exclusive, i.e. one
does not have to pursue ruthlessly one objective to the neglect of all
others. On the other hand, different objectives may and frequently do
conflict. To take an example from dairy marketing, it is clearly difficult
both to pay high prices to producers and to ensure low prices to urban
consumers unless the government has substantial spare funds at its disposal
with which to pay a heavy subsidy - a happy situation which very few
if any governments in sub-Saharan Africa face. Thus although governments
do not have to opt exclusively for just one objective it is important that
they consider which of these objectives are the most important and how
much of progress towards one objective they are prepared to sacrifice
in order to make progress towards another. If policy makers can become
clear in their minds about what their priorities are as between different
policy objectives, it then becomes possible to select the set of instruments
which most efficiently promotes those objectives. There are then,
conceptually, two rather different sorts of choices to make. Firstly,
choices about objectives; secondly, choices about which instruments
to employ in order to pursue best those objectives.
18. This may seem obvious to the point of tedium. In practice, however,
actual discussions of policy issues in developing and developed countries
alike often fail to distinguish clearly between instruments and the
objectives or the problems which a policy is supposed to solve. In the
ensuing mental confusion special interest groups who have no real claim
to priority on social, economic or even political grounds, but who are
blessed with fluent spokesmen, are able to secure privileges for themselves
which are costly to the nation as a whole and which a more clear-sighted
approach to policy would have avoided granting.
Improvements in policy
19. The preceding parts of this paper have established that it is important
that better livestock policies be adopted in Africa and have set out some
basic concepts and terminology for us to use in our discussions. We now
turn to considering how policies might be improved, and this also involves
consideration of the defects in the past and present situations. This
consideration is structured into three major categories: firstly, what
are the critical policy issues; secondly, how can we design better policies
and forecast what the results of different policies will be; and thirdly,
how can the policy formulation process be improved?
The critical policy issues
20. Anyone with a pencil and paper and half an hour to spare can quickly
draw up a list of 40 or 50 important policy issues in African livestock
development, and, with further time, can add to it daily. Do we need
to pick out from such lists the "critical" issues?
21. The answer is: yes, we do. Policy-making - like almost every other human
activity - consumes resources which are in scarce supply. There are
three principal scarce resources involved: firstly, the time of the key
decision makers who, if they are to make good policies, must have adequate
opportunity to discuss and reflect on the issues involved before they
decide them. The second principal resource is political impetus. Once
an appropriate policy is decided on it usually needs a great deal of effort
to convert it from an idea into the legislation, organisation and budget
necessary for it to become a reality. This, particularly with controversial
issues, requires that those who are promoting the policy lobby intensely
for it and use every piece of political influence, goodwill and support
they can muster to push it through. Again, such political influence is
a finite resource which must not be squandered. The third important
resource is the skill of the policy analysts who should be involved in
researching policy issues before decisions are taken. Such skills are
in particularly short supply in Africa.
22. The process of making good policies, therefore, consumes scarce resources.
If these resources are used up in the process of making policies of lower
priority, they will not be available for dealing with the really critical
policy issues. Each country needs to concentrate its attention and policy
making resources where the benefits from doing so are highest.
23. But how, in practice, are we to select these priorities? There are two
issues involved. Firstly, by what criteria should we compare the potential
benefits of tackling particular policy issues; that is another way of saying
how do we decide on their intrinsic importance. Secondly, how are we
to predict in advance either how much of the scarce resources a particular
piece of policy-making will consume or how much "benefits", in terms
of these criteria, it will yield? Clearly the situation will differ from
country to country, depending partly on how good or bad their existing
policies are and partly on a variety of natural, social or economic factors.
For example, with respect to criteria, in some countries the overall balance
between production and consumption of livestock commodities is
satisfactory but a serious emerging problem is the declining welfare
of a particular large group of livestock owners, e.g. nomadic pastoralists.
In these countries governments are likely to judge that the proper criterion
for concentrating on particular policy issues is their relevance to this
specific welfare problem. In other countries consumption of livestock
commodities is rising rapidly but production is stagnant, with the result
that imports of these commodities are growing fast and preempting foreign
exchange urgently needed for other purposes. In these countries policy
issues relevant to the rapid expansion of output are likely to be regarded
by governments as of the highest importance.
24. Explicit in this way of describing importance is the assumption that it
is importance as judged by the government of the country concerned
that matters. Implicit is the assumption that governments have some
kind of political or bureaucratic mechanism whereby a single "government
viewpoint" can be distilled from a variety of conflicting views of different
individuals or groups within the government. Neither of these assumptions
is unchallengeable but they are not issues which can be pursued here.
25. In evaluating intrinsic importance the criteria are specific to each country.
The experience of other countries, however, can be most useful in alerting
us to patterns of developments which are likely to occur; thereby enabling
us to diagnose at an early stage an emerging problem which might not
otherwise be diagnosed until it had reached crisis proportions.
26. Comparison of the experience of different countries could also help us
to predict the likely resource-costs and benefits of particular pieces
of policy-making, but so far there have not been enough studies of livestock
policy carried out, either in depth, i.e. of particular countries over long
periods in time, or in breadth, i.e. comparing the experience of many
2/different countries, to provide us yet with much objective guidance —
27. Here at ILCA we have already made some efforts to do cross-country
analysis to see whether data already collected and published by other
organisations enable us to identify, over a wide range of policies,
associations between particular sorts of policies and growth in livestock
output in a way that would enable us to pinpoint the key policy issues.
We looked, for example, at the scale of government expenditures on
veterinary services and research and at input marketing systems; but
we were unable to find significant relations with these variables
(McClintock, 1984). However, the data we had to use were unsatisfactory
in a variety of ways and we are now engaged in collecting more reliable
and relevant data. In the meantime, in the absence of objective analysis,
we all, as individuals, have to rely on subjective hunch to identify those
policy issues where concentration of effort in policy analysis and policy
making will yield the highest returns.
Designing better policies and forecasting results
28. It is easy to point to defects in existing policies, but we also need to
design better ones: and if governments are to be persuaded to pay more
attention to policy issues and to abandon previous inappropriate policies
and embrace new ones, they need to be convinced that these new policies
will bear the fruits promised. Do policy makers have to rely solely on
guesses or hunches about what the effects of new policies will be? Or
is it possible to provide them with more objective guidance? Is every
country a "special case" that can learn only from its own experience
in policy issues, or is it possible to draw on experience already obtained
in other countries? I believe that we can draw on experience elsewhere
but at the same time I suppose that most of us have become wary of
lines of reasoning that say that if a policy works in France/UK/USA/USSR
it must work in Africa also. We cannot hope to settle in this paper the
issue of the transferability of experience but it is a critically important
one which we should briefly consider.
29. Let me try to illustrate it, and since I am an economist I will take the
example of pricing policies for meat. Let us imagine (assume) a country
with a livestock sector composed partly of commercial ranchers, partly
of nomadic pastoralists and partly of mixed livestock - grain smallholder
enterprises. Let us also imagine that this is a country where in the past
livestock and meat prices remained quite low because of the possibility
of cheap imports from abroad while at the same time its meat exports
were constrained by disease regulations. Domestic livestock output
has stagnated and the import bill for meat has climbed alarmingly with
almost all imported meat being consumed in the main towns. Projections,
based on past trends in consumption and production, predict very large
and growing meat imports in the future. A recent donor-sponsored
livestock sector review has called for a change in government pricing
policy to raise prices to producers in order to elicit more domestic output
to replace imports. The government budget is very tight, so that it will
be impossible, by means of a consumption subsidy, to raise producer
prices without also raising consumer prices unless marketing margins
can be reduced. The domestic livestock and meat marketing system
is handled by large numbers of private traders. The country has very
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inadequate statistics on past levels of domestic production, consumption,
trade and prices on which to base predictions of the results of policy
changes. Data on growth in the human population are, however, available
and reliable.
30. In deciding whether to accept the advice to adopt a price-increasing
policy the government ought to consider a number of points. How rapidly
will domestic consumption and production increase in the absence of
changes in price? What price changes will occur anyway in the absence
of a change in policy? Does the government have the ability to raise
producer prices if it wants to? How much can marketing margins be
reduced in order to allow increases in producer prices without
corresponding rises in consumer prices? By how much will an x% rise
in consumer prices affect meat consumption (price elasticity of demand)?
By how much will a y% change in producer prices affect production for
sale (price elasticity of supply)? What will be the income and nutritional
effects on different groups of consumers and producers of a change
in price policy for meat?
31. These points need consideration by the government in order to compare
this (price-increasing) change in policy either with making no changes
at all or, more sensibly, with some other alternative policies which might
save an equivalent amount of foreign exchange. Whereas ideally one
would like to base predictions about the effects of a change in price
policy mainly on past experience of price policy changes within the same
country, often this may be impossible either for lack of data on the past
or because the country has itself recently altered so far and so fast that
predictions based on its own experience may no longer be relevant. It
may then have to rely on experience elsewhere.
32. I am going to be brave and hazard some opinions about the extent to
which analysis of experience in other countries on these points will provide
useful guidance to countries in sub-Saharan Africa which do not have
experience of their own on which to rely. These opinions are summarised
in Table 1 but only apply subject to the specific assumptions set out
three paragraphs previously.
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Table 1. The predictability of events in one
country on the basis of experience in other countries.
The extent
Event of
predictability
Future changes in quantities (assuming no price change)
(i) Produced
(ii) Consumed
X
y/J*
Future changes in prices (assuming no policy changes) X
Ability of government to affect prices u
/••Possible reduction in marketing margins
Effect of price changes on quantities
(i) Produced
(ii) Consumed
u
J
Effects on different groups of producers and consumers
(i) Income
(ii) Nutrition
J
\/ = Direction of change predictable but size of change only poorly predictable.
■J J = Both direction and size of change are predictable with reasonable accuracy.
* = In these cases the necessary data collection and analysis are, for the most part,
already complete. In the other cases marked J it is affirmed that such studies
could be successfully carried out.
X = Neither the direction nor size of change can be successfully predicted on the
basis of experience in other countries.
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A33. On most of the points I am fairly confident about the extent to which
experience in other countries can usefully guide policy and predict events
in a particular country. I have put a question mark, however, against
two points: the ability of government to affect prices; and the effect
of price changes on the amount produced. In principle a cross-country
study should be able to reveal the extent and the conditions under which
a government can enforce a policy, e.g. on meat and livestock prices.
However, it is a capability which is frequently overestimated and the
science of assessing administrative capacity is a young one; so perhaps
some caution is needed.
34. We can illustrate the kind of discrimination which needs to be exercised
in drawing on experience in other countries from the case of the effect
of price changes on the quantity of livestock and meat produced for
sale (supplied). In brief, some controversy exists as to whether price
rises are likely, in Africa, to lead to more or less livestock being supplied
for slaughter. Some people argue that African livestock producers have
limited needs for cash and a rise in price will merely enable them to
sell less animals to obtain the same amount of cash, and that there are
other factors which cause livestock owners to want to increase their
herd size. Others argue that livestock owners in Africa respond in the
same way as farmers do everywhere, and if prices rise they increase
output. Others argue that although in the long term livestock holders
will plan to increase output, in the short term, for sound economic reasons,
they may withhold animals from market; and yet others argue that African
pastoralists may not increase output in response to a price rise because
it is not profitable for them to do so. (For further discussion see Low,
1980; Jarvis, 1980; Sandford, 1983; Ariza-Nino and Shapiro, 1984; Ndzinge,
et al, 1984).
35. If we are to proceed beyond this controversy, we need to distinguish
between different kinds of livestock owners who may behave in different
ways and study each kind separately. For example, many traditional
African pastoralists in remote areas lack access either to consumer goods
on which to spend extra cash or to inputs purchaseable for cash (e.g.
feed concentrates, veterinary medicines) with which to increase output.
The response of such pastoralists to higher prices for their livestock
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is quite likely to be to sell fewer for they have other uses to which
livestock can be put. The response of commercial ranchers, however,
(depending on how permanent they think an increase in prices will be)
may be to sell off more animals quickly, to hold back animals temporarily
from the market in order to put more weight on them, or to convert
from a mainly breeding to a mainly fattening operation or vice versa.
The response of mixed grain - livestock smallholders will in turn be
somewhat different, and in drawing on experience from other countries
we need to be very aware of the systematic similarities and differences
between production systems in different countries so that we can draw
only on experience which is relevant to the situation of our own countries.
36. This example of policy in respect to prices will, I hope, be useful in
illustrating the extent to which experience in other countries can help
policy makers. The crucial issue is how closely the natural and social
aspects of the production, consumption or marketing systems in the
individual country match those of other countries from whose experience
it is hoped to learn. Obviously there will be no exact match and to that
extent the causal sequences will not be identical either. For a variety
of reasons the match is generally likely to be closer in the production
system between an African country and other African countries than
between an African country and countries in other parts of the world;
but as the pricing example shows even then one must have close regard
to the details of the production system. Experience in other continents
may be more applicable to Africa in respect of consumption and marketing
systems than it is for production; even so, considerable caution must
be exercised.
37. By implication the example of pricing policy also shows the extent to
which one particular kind of research, research which compares experience
in different countries ("cross-country" research), can be useful to the
same policy makers. At the moment, because of lack of policy-oriented
research, policy makers often have to guess at the probable results of
the policies they propose. We cannot ever expect to eliminate entirely
the role of guesswork in policy-making. But good research, both cross
country research and research which analyses in depth the experience
of particular countries, can greatly reduce the amount of guesswork
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which has to be done and so improve the reliability with which the results
of different policies can be predicted. Here at ILCA we are conducting
a number of both cross-country and in-depth, single-country studies on
policy issues.
Improvements in the process of policy formulation
38. Better policies in the livestock sector of sub-Saharan Africa are unlikely
to be adopted on a wide scale unless the process of policy analysis and
making (which, together, constitute "policy formulation") can itself be
improved. By process 1 include such things as: the early identification
of forthcoming problems and opportunities and of the policy options
open to government in confronting these; the analysis of the likely benefits
and costs of the various options; consultation with the interests (e.g.
consumers', producers', distributors', bureaucratic, political) most closely
involved so that unforeseen snags do not suddenly emerge; a clear decision
in favour of a particular policy which sets out the objectives and
instruments; and the management of the bureaucratic, political and
legislative process so that the policy decision becomes effective.
39. I am now going to present a caricature of the process of livestock policy
formulation as currently practised in sub-Saharan Africa. The caricature
is cruel, mythical and does not apply closely to any one country in Africa
or to any one donor. But such caricatures or "parables" are useful devices
for bringing to life general principles which, in the abstract, are some
what boring. There are probably elements in this particular caricature
which correspond closely enough to actual experience to make many
readers of this paper uncomfortable.
A caricature of policy formulation
40. Some years ago in country A the government changed and the new
government immediately announced, without consultation with its technical
services, that in future the new vaccine TRIPKIL against trypanosomiasis
would be provided free of charge by the veterinary services to any
3/stockowner requesting it— . Trypanosomiasis is only a problem in one
corner of country A which traditionally has no livestock but which is
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currently being opened up for commercial ranching. TRIPKIL is extremely
expensive, has to be imported, and the veterinary services can only meet,
at 20 000 doses annually, about half the demand for it but use 60% of
their total annual budget for drugs and vaccines in doing so. TRIPKIL
has to be stored in a deep freeze until 12 hours before use. The veterinary
department has an alternative cheaper scheme for dealing with the problem
of trypanosomiasis but lacks anyone experienced in the bureaucratic
skills of "project preparation" who can prepare the necessary feasibility
study to secure financing.
41. Shortly after the new government came into power donor B offered to
fund a new policy unit in the ministry of livestock. Donor B has provided
for the unit an expatriate policy expert, an agricultural economist who
previously worked in Indonesia, and he has arrived with his micro computer
3/and a special policy software programme for it called WONGO— . At
the moment there are no other staff in the policy unit as all the local
staff are away on training abroad. The director of veterinary services
disapproves of the policy unit, and the policy expert reports directly
to the Permanent Secretary of the ministry who until recently was a
research scientist in animal genetics. The policy expert frequently sends
to the Permanent Secretary thoughtful memoranda full of mathematical
equations and computer print-outs. The Permanent Secretary tried to
read one of these but could not understand it and, in any case, he is far
too busy to do so because for several months he has spent all his time
trying to get a consignment of 4-wheel drive vehicles intended for the
veterinary services released from the customs warehouse.
42. The Permanent Secretary is also very busy trying to get a new US$ 50
million tannery project ready for appraisal and financing by donor B.
At this point in time the appraisal team arrives and is very impressed
by the tannery project although it realizes that there are going to be
problems in securing enough funds from the goverment's livestock ministry
budget to finance the government's contribution to the project.
Nevertheless, the team invites the government to send a delegation abroad
to B to negotiate the project. On the last night of the appraisal team's
visit they have dinner with the policy expert (who is an old colleague
of the team leader's from Indonesia days) and he explains the latest output
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of his WONGO programme and the solution it has found to the problem
of the rising TRIPKIL subsidy.
43. When the government's negotiating team reach B they find the donor
enthusiastic about financing the tannery, but at the last minute in the
negotiations donor B demands, as a condition of the loan, that country
A agrees to eradicate the TRIPKIL subsidy along the lines the policy
expert's computer has suggested. These are that in the future TRIPKIL
is to be handled exclusively by private rural pharmacies who will be
required by law to stock it and sell it from their deep freezes at the
wholesale price. In country A rural pharmacies have no deep freezes
or any use for them except to store TRIPKIL. The negotiating delegation
from country A are told by the donor that unless they agree immediately
to this condition negotiations will be suspended and cannot be resumed,
due to the donor's own timetable, for another 12 months. Country A's
negotiating delegation agree, sign the agreement and return home. Shortly
thereafter the tannery project starts and the TRIPKIL rural pharmacy
legislation is enacted by presidential decree.
44. Soon after the publication of the decree the chairmen of the Rural
Pharmacies Association and of the Commercial Ranchers' Cooperative
- who happen to be senior officials in the governing political party -
call on the President one evening and explain how the new law will ruin
rural pharmacies by forcing them to buy expensive deep freezes whose
cost they will not be allowed to recover from TRIPKIL's retail price.
The first time the Permanent Secretary of the livestock ministry gets
to know of these discussions is when these two chairmen call on him
the following morning bearing a written order to him from the President
requiring him to supply immediately, and free of charge, 40 000 doses
of TRIPKIL and 200 deep freezes for distribution to rural pharmacies.
45. A fantastic story which we all hope could not be true. But it aptly
illustrates the critical weakness of the process of much policy formulation
in the livestock field in Africa: i.e.
a) Inadequate indigenous capacity in analytic skills.
b) Policy makers who are too bogged down in detailed day-to
day executive work to have time to consider policy issues and
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who lack experience or training in dealing with them.
c) A failure to identify all the policy options.
d) A policy unit whose existence and role is not accepted by one
of the technical services in whose subject-area it is supposed
to analyse policy.
e) Inadequate mechanisms within the state bureaucracy to discuss
policy issues.
f) A divorce between bureaucratic "policy formulation" and the
real world of economics and politics as practised by political
parties and economic interests, so that "policy formulation"
fails to identify practical problems (the deep freeze issue!),
to come up with policies which are politically realistic, or to
subject special pleading by interest groups to critical analysis
in the light of the overall interest.
g) A policy issue that is only tackled either in emergencies and
by politicians without consulting their officials or when a donor
applies pressure, even though it clearly needs tackling
systematically in the country's own interest.
h) A donor who is enthusiastic but naive about policy-making and
who believes the timetable of policy-making in any country
can -be altered to fit the donor's convenience,
i) An "old boy network" alliance between expatriate technical
assistance experts and the staff of a donor that is responsible
to no one, and, at the same time, both technically and politically
incompetent,
j) The use of "sophisticated" techniques for policy analysis which
obscure and mystify rather than clarify issues for policy makers.
46. This section of the paper has identified a number of problems in the
process of policy analysis and policy-making but has not provided any
suggestion for their solution. Urgent attention needs to be given to
consideration of how the process of policy formulation can be improved,
and in particular:-
a) What bureaucratic organisations and mechanisms are needed for
analysis and coordination of livestock policies.
b) What extra resources (time!) and skills are needed to facilitate good
policy analysis and policy-making. Is there a role for in-service training
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in policy-making for senior officials appointed late in their careers
to posts involving policy issues?
c) How can bureaucrats, economic interests and political parties best
communicate with and confront each other so that legitimate interests
can be taken into account and illegitimate special pleading exposed
to public scrutiny?
d) What helpful role can donors play to improve livestock policy making
in Africa?
Conclusions
47. Policy issues are important and better policies can contribute to meeting
African governments' objectives, whether these be simply increased
livestock output or something else. Better policies can be introduced
by concentrating on the issues of highest priority and by designing better
policies to deal with these issues. Better policies can often be designed
by drawing on experience from other countries, and research can be
helpful in drawing the right lessons from this experience. A necessary
condition for identifying the key issues and for designing better policies
to deal with them is the existence of a proper process for policy
formulation.
19
FOOTNOTES
1/ A version of this paper was first presented at the conference on Livestock
Policy Issues in Africa, held at the International Livestock Centre for
Africa from 24th to 28th September 1984.
2/ ILCA's Livestock Policy Unit is currently engaged in a number of studies,
comparing experience in different countries, which it is hoped will throw
light on this. Raikes (1981) provides some in-depth information in respect
of three countries in East Africa.
3/ TRIPKIL and WONGO are brand names fabricated by the author and do
not refer to any products actually in existence. In any case, a vaccine
against trypanosomiasis does not yet exist.
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